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INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF A
DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION STRATEGY: EXTENDING A
PREDATORY LITIGATION STRATEGY TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Kim H. Jordant
Time was, as soon as a product was perfected in the laboratory, its
developers headed straight for the market. For a growing number
of American companies, though, the first step is into the
courtroom.1
American business' use of intellectual property' protection has
increased dramatically since 1982. The increased use has been attrib-
uted to the creation 3 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982;4 pressures on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to award
patents on minor advances; 5 and the use of a business litigation strat-
egy to protect a firms intellectual property and consequent market
share.6
This essay 1) surveys several current decisions indicative of the
present state of domestic IP protection; 2) discusses the forums a do-
mestic firm has available when confronted with a foreign firm's in-
fringement of a domestic IP right; 3) defines a domestic business or
predatory litigation strategy which protects a firm's market share or
slows competition; and 4) analyzes the concerns a domestic firm
faces when pursuing a business litigation IP protection strategy in the
EC.
Copyright © 1995 by Kim H. Jordan.
t B.A., University of California, San Diego, 1977; J.D., Santa Clara University School
of Law, 1995.
1. Shingo Miyake, It's Patent Fraud, Mitsubishi Tells Wang; Accusations Fly as Law-
suits Multiply, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Aug. 8, 1992, at 11.
2. Intellectual property ["IP"] refers to a broad collection of rights relating to things such
as works of authorship, inventions, trademarks, designs and trade secrets.
3. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 171(West 1995).
4. Corporate Counsel Roundtable: Intellectual Property, TEXAS LAWYER, Dec 14, 1992
at 8.
5. Arthur Wineburg, Reconciling IP Rights and Industrial Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
13, 1993, at S29.
6. Rogers:Intel uses courts to slow competitors, INsowomm, Aug. 10, 1992 at 90.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the scope of U.S. business becomes more international, do-
mestic firms need to determine how to project their domestic IP pro-
tection strategy abroad. By discovering the difference in application,
enforcement and scope of protection between domestic and foreign
schemes, domestic firms may be able to successfully project their IP
protection strategies abroad. As an example, a patent granted in the
United States gives the holder the exclusive right to use a particular
process or make a particular product for 17 years.7 It does not require
a holder to work or license the product or process. The 'exclusive'
right to exploit a patent puts the U.S. in the minority of jurisdictions
which do not require local working, or other use of the patent, for it to
remain viable. This may result in an unpleasant surprise when, for
instance, a foreign country notifies the U.S. holder of a foreign patent
that a compulsory license of the patent for a 'reasonable royalty' based
on 'abuse' of 'dominant position' has been awarded.8 The justifica-
tion for the complusory license being that the patent owner should not
be entitled by law to deny the benefits of the patented invention to the
public.
After the International Trade Commission ruling, settlement agree-
ments have brought "Texas Instruments more than 400 million in
royalties. Now that landmark victory has come back to haunt...
TI."
9
In the domestic market, firms have used IP protection for many
years to protect assets. With the playing field being fairly level, the
rules remain clear but their application unclear despite being under
one jurisdiction. Over the last five years, though, the value of intellec-
tual property has increased dramatically,10 with a corresponding in-
crease in what is at stake.' More importantly, companies have tried
7. This will be changed by the enabling legislation for the GATT treaty to 20 years form
date of filing.
8. Arthur Wineburg, U.S. trade threats spur Asian laws on Intellectual Property, NAT'L
L. J., July 13, 1992 at 29.
9. Anthony Baldo, David's Sling, FIN. WORLD, July 24, 1990, at 28.
10. TEXAS LAWYER, supra note 4, at 8.
11. If the court is perceived to be pro-patent, companies - foreign and domestic
- apply for more patents, partly for offensive and partly for defensive reason.
This can spur speculative suits by patent holders fearing infringement... some-
times... win large damage awards and possibly even the right to shut down a
competitor who has actually independently researched and developed a similar
product.
Garry Sturgess, From Chaos to Complacency, LEGAL Tmms, June 17, 1991, at 11 (Supp.).
[Vol. I11
PREDATORY LITIGAION
to build up their patent portfolio to make it a profit center 12 and have
tried to use existing patents to protect their market share. 13
The issue of infringement suits as a business intimidation strategy
comes up often at young companies... The scenario... often
involves a patent holder who threatens all potential competitors in
the same area of technology with scorched-earth infringement liti-
gation, unless the other companies, especially those that are for-
eign-owned, will cave in, and pay the license fees rather than risk
all in a lengthy court fight.14
For example, Intel's strategy warranted a judicial note. In Cryix
Corp v. Intel Corp,5 the court found as fact that:
In the 1970's, Intel's licensing strategy was consistent with the in-
dustry-wide strategy - to grant broad, unlimited patent licenses in
exchange for cross-licenses back of equal scope. Today, Intel has
changed its strategy. Now... Intel believes that its patent position
is so unbalanced relative to others in the industry that it seeks sig-
nificant monetary compensation for patents in the process of nego-
tiating licenses.
Once a company decides to do business abroad, besides the usual
competitive and commercial analysis of a market, the firm must inves-
tigate the IP laws and practices of the country. The company must be
aware that generally U.S. IP protection laws do not reach outside the
U.S. and its possessions. 6 The IP protection that is available may be
conferred by treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property; the Patent Cooperation Treaty; the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; 7 or the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention.
However, problems exist. For example, the U.S. did not become
a party to the Berne Convention until March 1, 1989, which means
that only works published on or after that date may rely on it for pro-
tection. These issues must be addressed when attempting to apply a
domestic IP protection strategy to a foreign market."i
There are two instances where a domestic company will be faced
with the complications of foreign competition, IP protection and con-
sequent threat to market share. In the first, a domestic firm discovers
12. LEGAL TnAms, supra note 5, at S29.
13. See INIowolu., supra note 6, at 90.
14. Victoria Slind-Flor, High-Tech Needs, NAT'L L. J., July 5, 1993, at 1.
15. 803 F. Supp 1200, 1205(E.D. Tex. 1992); appeal dismissed without op., 9 F.3d 978
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
16. But see section IV below: Extraterritorial effect of U.S. court holdings.
17. All EC member states are members of the convention except Belgium and Ireland.
18. Bus. AM., July 1, 1991, at 2.
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the import of goods which may infringe its domestic IP protection. In
the second, the firm may find foreign producers manufacturing and/or
selling goods abroad which infringe foreign IP protections. Each issue
has different aspects and implications and will be considered sepa-
rately, specifically with respect to the non-traditional market share
use. As a foundation to that consideration, this comment surveys the
domestic IP protection environment and how this experience may
translate abroad.
II. DoMmsTic IP PROTECTION
There are several types of IP protection available to a domestic
company. Patents, trademarks, copyrights and technology licenses are
the major protections available. 9
... [A]s an outsider looking in, I would have bet anyone money
that Intel would have come after them. Intel has a monopolistic
position to protect. They don't take kindly to someone entering the
marketplace.20
In Cyrix v. Intel,21 Intel granted SGS-Thomson a cross-license
covering technology in its line of math co-processors. Texas-based
Cyrix Corp, contracted with SGS-Thomson for the manufacture of co-
processors engineered to Cyrix's specifications. Intel claimed that
Cyrix infringed an Intel patent. Cyrix argued that even if there was
infringement, Cyrix was immune from an infringement suit by virtue
of the cross-license between SGS-Thomson and Intel. Cyrix relied on
the ruling in Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Technology Inc.,22 which in-
sulated a similarly situated licensee from patent infringement action
due to a cross-license.23 The court in Cyrix found that the license
placed Cyrix beyond the reach of infringement actions by Intel.
Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner2 4 was an authorized sale by licensee
case. The court found that an authorized sale of a patented invention
by a licensee to a third party places any resale by the third party be-
yond the reach of the infringement statute in the U.S. by reason of the
third party's authority to resell the product derived from the licensee.
19. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do an in depth analysis of the different types of
IP protection available to domestic firms.
20. TEXAS LAWYER, supra note 4, at 11.
21. 803 F.Supp. at 1200.
22. 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 923.
23. Los AN GELs DALmY J., Aug 9, 1993, at 3.
24. 824 F.2d. 965, 968 (Fed.Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042.
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In MAI Systems Corp v. Peak Computer Inc.,25 the court ex-
tended copyright protection. The court held that turning on a com-
puter and loading the operating system software into RAM26 makes a
copy of the computer program, which is an act of copyright infringe-
ment when done by a licensee of the software instead of the owner of
a copy. The copy made when the computer was turned on was 'fixed'
in such a manner to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration. The court did not
reach how long a copy had to be in RAM to be fixed or if the repair of
a computer was a 'fair use' of the software or even if there is an im-
plied license to have anyone repair an owner's software. However,
MAI Systems is an example of how much protection a holder of a
valid domestic copyright can expect when participating in the U.S.
market. (See Intel v. Terabyte International Inc.,27 where the court
applied the Lanham Act2 in a trademark infringement action to find
willful misappropriation of Intel's trademark. Similarly, in Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,29 the court found that proof of secondary
meaning is not required to prevail on a claim under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive.)
One of the lessons learned from the Intel-AMD litigation, which
started with a technology-sharing agreement signed in 1976, is that the
trend in the computer industry suggests that trademarks will play an
increasingly important role for computer companies. 3° The necessity
to be compatible with products of other manufacturers reduces techno-
logical differentiation and increases the importance of marketing.
Trademarks and unfair competition law play a crucial role in such
marketing. As personal computer products are increasingly sold like
other consumer products, trademarks will play an important role in
such sales, with federal trademark registration the best method of pro-
tection within the U.S. market.
Federal trademark registration is advantageous because: it serves
as prima facie evidence of ownership of the mark and exclusive right
to use it; it serves as constructive notice of this claim of ownership
throughout the United States. Five years after registration and contin-
uous use, the registration can become incontestable which substan-
tially reduces the basis for challenge to the mark. Also, lawsuits may
25. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 671.
26. Random Access Memory
27. 6 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1993).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
29. - U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
30. Intel v. AMD: Lessons from the 386 Decision, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv., Dec. 1992, at
451.
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be brought in federal court and registered marks may be filed with
U.S. Customs to help prevent importation of goods bearing infringing
trade marks.31
In addition to the offensive IP protections above, a domestic firm
also has four major defenses to a patent infringement claim against it:
1) invalidity of the patent, where the accused infringer escapes liabil-
ity by establishing that the invention fails to meet the requirements of
patentability; 2) fraudulent conduct in the procurement of the patent,
where the patent holder who owes a duty to the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) can be shown to have breached that duty; 3) violation of
the antitrust laws, where the patent holder exploits the patent in an
improper manner by violating the antitrust laws; or 4) delay in filing
suit resulting in laches or estoppel.
III. DOMESTIC FIRMS VS. FOREIGN FIRMS N THE U.S.
Texas Instruments (TI) has dramatically asserted its rights to profit
from the invention of fundamental semiconductor technology. In a
spate of lawsuits being filed against Japanese and South Korean
competitors, the company accuses the foreign groups of infringing
its patents by manufacturing... chips and selling them in the U.S.
without having licenses under TI's patents ... with its suits, TI is
adopting a 'more assertive policy with respect to licensing and pro-
tection of patents than in the past... In addition, TI plans to file an
action with the ITC seeking relief from injury due to patent
infringement.32
When a domestic firm is faced with an infringement of a domes-
tic IP right by a foreign company, it has a choice of two forums in
which to proceed domestically. It can take it's complaint either to the
Federal District Court (FDC) or the International Trade Commission
(ITC) or to both simultaneously.
A. Characteristics of ITC proceedings vs FDC proceedings
ITC and FDC proceedings have different jurisdictional founda-
tions, final adjudications, purposes, proof, time constraints, remedies,
issues on appeal, and foreign perceptions. Similarities can be found,
though, in the criteria for bad faith/predatory litigation.
ITC investigations are instituted by the ITC whether on its own
initiative or after receipt of a complaint which the ITC has evaluated
31. Id. at 454.
32. World Trade News, FiN. TAms LIMITED, Jan 28, 1986, at 4.
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for its sufficiency.33 The complaint must be supported by a detailed
statement of facts34 because of the stringent time restrictions. This re-
quirement is greater than the Federal Rules require.35 After being in-
stituted the matter is referred to an administrative law judge (ALJ)
who conducts the investigation.36
After the ITC determination, it is transmitted to the President
who has sixty days in which to disapprove the determination.37 If the
president approves (or does not disprove) the ITC determination, then
an adversely affected party may appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.38
Conversely, a FDC proceeding is brought by an private party
with the standing to bring the suit. The complaint must state "... a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled
to relief. .
The two proceedings overlap where the district court attempts to
determine whether a domestic patent has been infringed and where the
ITC attempts to determine whether articles which have been imported
infringe a domestic patent. Both proceedings share proof of patent
validity,40 enforceability, and infringement. But the ITC proceeding is
a much broader investigation and the district court adjudication is but
one relevant component of the ITC investigation.
33. In the Matter of CERTAIN PERSONAL COMPUTERS WITH MEMORY MAN-
AGEMENT INFORMATION STORED IN EXTERNAL MEMORY AND RELATED
MATERIALS, Investigation No 337-TA-352. 1993 ITC LEXIS 363, June 9, 1993.
Intel filed a complaint against Twinhead Corporation of Taiwan under 19
U.S.C. § 1337 in May 1993. The complaint alleged violations of § 1337 in the
importation into the U. S., the sale for importation, and the sale within the U.S.
after importation of... by reason of direct and induced infringement of ... as
required by subsection of § 1337. The complaint requested an investigation and
issuance of a permanent exclusion order and permanent cease and desist orders.
Once the complaint is filed the respondent must file a timely response to
each allegation in the complaint and answer the notice of investigation. Failure to
do so may be deemed to constitute a waiver of the right to appear and contest the
allegations of the complaint and this notice, and to authorize the ALI and the
Commission, without further notice to such respondent, to find the facts to be as
alleged in the complaint and to enter both an initial determination and a final
determination containing such findings, and may result in the issuance of a lim-
ited exclusion order or a cease and desist order or both directed against such
respondent.
34. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. v. U.S., 659 F.2d 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
35. FnD. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
36. 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.10-.15 (1984).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1994).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994).
39. FED. IR Civ. P. 8(a): the general rule of notice pleading.
40. "A patent's validity may be challenged on several grounds such as anticipation or
obviousness." Texas Instruments v. U.S.I.T.C., 988 F.2d 1165, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
B. Jurisdiction
Patent law is based upon Article 1, § VIII, of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Congress placed original jurisdiction over patent actions exclu-
sively in the federal district courts.4" Therefore, only a federal district
court may adjudicate patent validity, enforceability and infringement
issues. Appeal of the district court decision may be taken to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.42 On the other hand, original juris-
diction over unfair practices in import trade lies exclusively with the
ITC.4 3 Appeals from ITC decisions may also be taken to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit." The ITC makes a determination as
to patent issues, but it has no jurisdiction to make a binding adjudica-
tion on patent matters. Jurisdiction in an ITC proceeding is in rem as
opposed to in personam which removes the problem of establishing
jurisdiction over foreign parties.45 Neither a federal district court nor
the ITC may transgress upon the jurisdiction of the other.46
C. Are re-imports within section ITC jursdiction?
In In the Matter of CERTAIN SPUTTERED CARBON, 47 domes-
tic and foreign corporations were accused of unfair competition by
manufacturing infringing products in the U.S. These corporations
then sold the products to entities in the Far East with the expectation
that they would be assembled into systems outside the U.S. and re-
imported into the U.S. The respondents argued that the ITC did not
have in rem jurisdiction over the products in question as they were
produced in the U.S. and the ITC was given jurisdiction only over
foreign manufactured goods. The court held that the infringement
took place during manufacture which occurred in the U.S. This gave
the complainant a remedy in federal district court against infringement
occurring in the U.S. and that such infringement was beyond the scope
of the Commission's jurisdiction conferred in the statute."
In Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S.L.T C.,49 an administrative law
judge found that several foreign and domestic companies were infring-
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . .
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1994).
43. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1332(b), 1337.
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
45. Sealed Air Corp v. USITC, 645 F.2d 976, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
46-. Ashow, Ltd, v. Morgan Construction Co., 672 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1982).
47. In the Matter of CERTAIN SPUTTERED CARBON COATED COMPUTER DISKS
AND PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME, INCLUDING DISK DRIVES, Investigation No.
337-TA -350, 1993 ITC LEXIS 288, May 27, 1993.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
49. 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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ing Texas Instruments' valid patents. The ITC affirmed the ALJ's rul-
ing and both sides appealed to the Federal Circuit. In affirming the
ITC's order the Federal Circuit found that 19 U.S.C. § 1337 applies to
U.S. manufacturers. The plain language of § 1337 prohibits the im-
portation of articles found to infringe a valid and enforceable U.S.
patent by any importer or consignee. There is no exemption or immu-
nity for domestic firms when importation of infringing articles manu-
factured abroad occurs. Both decisions indicate that firms which have
shifted abroad portions of their operations and export semi-finished
parts for finishing and then re-import them may be vulnerable to
§ 1337 proceedings. Domestic firms are subject to ITC jurisdiction
when attempting to re-import infringing articles and consequently can-
not expect to be immune from a § 1337 ITC action.
D. Purposes of bringing an action in the FDC vs. the ITC
A district court decides validity, enforceability and infringement
of U.S. patents. The district court determination has no extraterritorial
effect.50 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a finding of
cognizable injury under the Lanham Act may allow for extraterritorial
injunction when infringement of a patent is found." An ITC investi-
gation of unfair competition based upon patent infringement always
contains an international element. The ITC focuses on preventing the
importation of the infringing article or process 52 if unfair methods of
competition (i.e. patent infringement) are shown to injure a domestic
industry.5 3
While the majority of investigations under § 1337 have involved
patent infringement, other investigations have included trademark in-
fringement, 'passing off', false advertising, false representation, mis-
appropriation of trade dress, trademark dilution, copyright
infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and interference with
contractual relations.54
50. But see, Baldwin Hardware Corp v. Franksu Enterprise Corp, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS
20039; 1992-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) P69,723. (Finding of cognizable injury under the Lanham Act
could allow for extraterritorial injunction when infringement of a patent is found.)
51. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1987).
52. Amgen Inc. v. U.S.I.T.C., 902 F.2d 1532, 1539 (Fed.Cir. 1990), where the court held
that the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, was not intended to prohibit the importation of articles
made abroad by a process in which a product claimed in a U.S. patent was used.
53. Massachusetts Institute of Technology vs. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
54. A practitioner's guide to Section 1337 litigation before the international trade commis-
sion, 17 LAw AN PoL'Y INra-RL Bus. 521 (1985).
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E. Proof and timing
Proof in a FDC patent case centers on validity, enforceability,
and infringement. There are no statutory time limits with respect to
patent litigation. In an ITC action, there must be a determination
within 12 months (or 18 months in complicated cases) whether: a)
there are imports into the U.S.; b) there is a domestic industry; and c)
there are unfair acts of competition. If the ITC cannot make an affirm-
ative finding as to each component of the injury, it may not issue a
remedial order." However, when the subject-matter of the contro-
versy is intellectual property then:
[W]hen determining injury,... the holder of an intellectual prop-
erty right has a smaller quantum of proof of injury than would be
required in a non-intellectual property based case. This smaller
quantum of proof is in the sense that fewer incidents of lost sales
might be sufficient to establish injury.56
The ruling was not directed to lessening the quality and quantum
of evidence necessary to establish the facts on which the injury deter-
mination is based. Once the ITC has made affirmative findings it may
order the exclusion of the articles from entry into the U.S. or issue a
cease and desist order to a party requiring them to stop all unfair acts
of competition.
F. An example of an ITC determination
In the matter of Certain Erasable Programmable Read Only
Memories, an investigation was begun by the ITC in September
1987 under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The commission issued a final determi-
nation on March 16, 1989. The determination and orders were af-
firmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.58 In July 1989 Intel filed a request for formal enforcement
proceedings, alleging that defendant was violating the exclusion order
and the cease and desist order. The commission designated an admin-
istrative law judge who came to a recommended determination in June
1990 that Atmel had violated the commission's orders and recom-
mended a civil penalty. The recommended determination was ap-
pealed to the commission. In March 1991 the commission adopted the
recommended determination and issued its opinion in August 1991.
55. See Fischer and Porter vs. U.S.I.T.C., 831 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
56. Fischer, 831 F.2d at 1577.
57. 1992 ITC Lexis 274 (1992).
58. See Hyundai Electronics v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), and Intel Corporation v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 946 F.2d 821
(Fed.Cir. 1991).
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Both parties executed a settlement agreement in March 1992 and pur-
suant to that agreement both parties filed .motions to dismiss formal
enforcement proceedings. The commission vacated its order imposing
penalties in May 1992.
G. Remedies
In an FDC action, the successful plaintiff may obtain injunctive
and monetary relief against the defendant for infringement which oc-
curs in the U.S. The court can efjoin future infringement and award
damages for past infringement.
The successful ITC plaintiff can normally obtain an exclusion or-
der,5 9 or a cease and desist order.60 The order is in rem, and it is
directed to exclusion of the product. Therefore, it is not limited to the
respondents named before the ITC. This allows the plaintiff to obtain
a remedy against the entire spectrum of importers by suing only one or
a few of the importers of the infringing merchandise.61 However, the
ITC order only covers present or future acts, it is not remedial in
nature.
H. Issues of Appeal
Appeal from both ITC and FDC patent-related actions are placed
with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.62 However the is-
sues of appeal are different. For FDC adjudications, the appellate
court reviews issues of patent validity, enforceability and infringe-
ment. An appeal from an ITC decision, though solely determines
whether the ITC made a correct determination with respect to unfair
practices in import trade, and issued an appropriate remedial order
under 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
I. Preclusion
Once the issue of patent validity has been heard by the ITC and
the appeal by the Federal Circuit, the Preclusion Doctrine may be
used to bar further litigation of the issue in the district courts.63 This
doctrine has its roots in the common law principle that a right, ques-
tion, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit be-
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1).
61. Sealed Air Corp v. U.S. ITC Polybubble, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (6).
63. In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 814 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (D. Del.
1993).
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tween the same partiesfr4 The effect of this doctrine is that if the ITC
in its determination of unfair trade practices rules on the validity of the
patent in question and the Federal Circuit affirms, then the ITC ruling
precludes the losing party from re-litigating the issue in Federal Dis-
trict Court.
J. Foreign View of the FDC and ITC proceedings
The foreign viewpoint is that by authorizing the barring of im-
ports, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 appears, in effect, to be a non-tariff trade
barrier.65 This view holds that the differences in patent enforcement
procedure in proceedings against imports using the ITC as opposed to
the federal court's constitutes 'less favorable treatment' of imports
contrary to Article III, § 4 of GATT. 61 A GATT panel specified 1)
the shorter time limits under § 1337; 2) inadmissibility of counter-
claims under § 1337; 3) in rem exclusion orders available under
§ 1337; and 4) the possibility of double proceedings against imports
but only single proceedings against domestic products, as tending to
show the 'less favorable treatment.' 67
A companion [to the ITC case] patent infringement action has been
simultaneously filed in the Federal District Court... [T]hese ac-
tions are necessitated by acts of infringement by these companies in
transferring technology to foreign manufacturers, and the subse-
quent importation of unlicensed products into the U.S.68
This GATT Panel report came out before the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 became effective. This is important be-
cause the 1988 Act impacted the GATT recommendations in four
ways. First, the act removed the requirement of injury to an industry
as a condition for granting relief in intellectual property-related pro-
ceedings before the ITC. Second, it is no longer necessary to demon-
strate that the industry is efficiently and economically operated.69
Third, the Act makes process patents subject to an ITC proceeding.
64. See Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
65. Business Watch; Intellectual Property NAT'L L. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at 21.
66. RE THE DU PONT DE NEMOURS/AKZO DISPUTE: EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY v. UNITED STATE OF AMERICA, A Gat Panel, [1989] 1 CMLR 715
(LEXIS, EurcomCases).
67. In response to the GATT Panel report, a bill was introduced in 1992 that would
amend 1337, 1) it would delete strict time limits and substitute "the earliest practi-
cable time."; 2) it would allow counterclaims that are directly related to the sub-
stantive violation; and 3) it would require the District court to stay its proceedings
until the ITC's determination became final.
Business Watch; Intellectual Property, NAT. L. J., Nov 30, 1992, at 21.
68. FiN. Tnrms, Aug. 6, 1987, at 36.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B).
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Finally, the Act increases the statutory definition of activities that
qualify a firm as an industry in the U.S. for purposes of bringing a
§ 1337 action (i.e. substantial investment in the exploitation of an in-
tellectual property right).7"
K. Bad Faith in an FDC and ITC proceeding
In addition to the above changes, the 1988 Act also expressly
authorized the ITC to prescribe by rule sanctions for abuse of process
or discovery based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It granted
the ITC the power to impose on parties and their counsel the same
obligations as Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [i.e. it
requires counsel to sign the complaint to verify that the facts alleged
are accurate on information and belief upon reasonable inquiry; it pro-
hibits filing of any document for improper purposes]. The possible
remedies71 for violations include, sanctions and dismissing a com-
plaint or defense.72
These changes make the criteria for bad faith73 the same whether
the case is before the ITC or the district court. For example, in Chem-
ical Engineering Corp v. Marlo, Inc.74 the court found plaintiff's
statements were a "flagrant attempt to mislead" the court and an
"abuse of the judicial process of the part of counsel... [N]o authority
anywhere supports the notion that a preliminary injunction against in-
fringement may issue in response to rumors of a threat of infringe-
ment." The court then affirmed the summary judgment order of the
lower court. While in Al-Site Corp. v. Opti-Ray Inc. 75 the court said,
"[n]o basis, other than continued harassment of a possible contract
partner of [defendant], can be seen for the filing of.the present appeal"
and dismissed the appeal.
The party defending patent infringement has the burden of prov-
ing bad faith. "A patentee's infringement suit is presumptively in
good faith and that this presumption can be rebutted only by clear and
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(B).
71. "[A] court has the inherent authority to assess attorney fees against party who has acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason." Jaquette v Black Hawk County,
710 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(h).
73. Courts have illustrated what incidents may constitute bad faith ".. every issue was
disputed and thoroughly over briefed.. a motion to reconsider was filed after essentially every
ruling., the second counterclaim was clearly frivolous.. [they] filed all pleadings under seal
claiming a privilege where there was no legitimate argument for such claim.' Exxon Chemical v.
Lubrizol, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4966, *7-*8; 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1871 (1993).
74. 754 F. 2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
75. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9807; 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d(BNA) 1058.
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convincing evidence."76 Courts have emphasized that when bringing
a suit for patent infringement, if the plaintiff has sought advice by
outside patent counsel, conducted tests and analyzed the patent before
commencing the suit, a finding of bad faith could not be supported.77
The patentee is also allowed to warn competitors, "... . [a patentee]
may notify a competitor's customers of the pendency of an infringe-
ment suit and warn them of similar actions, if the patentee acts in good
faith... infringement suits cannot be threatened in bad faith for the
purpose of inhibiting customer purchases and injuring the competi-
tor's business."78
L. Bad faith and predatory litigation
[I]ntel... one of Silicon Valley's most litigious companies ...
tough and savvy, willing to protect its extensive research invest-
ment... [or just] a bully that would rather litigate than compete in
the market-place. 79
If bad faith can be shown80 in the bringing of the infringement
suit then the plaintiff faces a possible antitrust action under § 1 and/or
§ 281 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act."2 The court found in Handg-
ards, Inc. v Ethicon83 that bringing a series of ill-founded patent in-
fringement actions, in bad faith, can constitute an antitrust violation.
It is sufficient if such suits are initiated or pursued with intent to mo-
nopolize a particular industry and other elements of § 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act are present.
To bring the alleged behavior under § 2 the plaintiff must show a
specific intent to monopolize and a "dangerous probability" that the
attempt will be successful in achieving a monopoly in the relevant
market.84 In Handgards, the court expanded that definition when at-
tempting to establish a § 2 antitrust liability in a bad faith patent litiga-
tion. There the plaintiff had to prove 1) by clear and convincing
76. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon. Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. Loctite Corp v. Ultraseal, Ltd, 781 F.2d 861, 877-8 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
78. Lucasey Mfg. Corp v. Anchor Pad Intn'i Inc., 698 F. Supp. 190, 192 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
79. Susan Kostal, Intel's Enforcer, CALIFoRmA LAwVCR, Aug. 1992, at 96, 98.
80. ".... [T]he requisite motive... is the intent to harm one's competitors not by the result
of the litigation but by the simple fact of the institution of litigation." MCI Communications
Corp v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1157 (7th. Cir. 1983).
81. Section 2: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Section 1:
"Every contract, combination in the form... in restraint of trade or commerce... is declared to
be illegal . .
82. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
83. 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir 1984); cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
84. Loctite, 781 F.2d at 875.
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evidence that the patentee prosecuted the patent suit in bad faith; 2)
that the patentee had a specific intent to monopolize the relevant mar-
ket, and 3) that a dangerous probability of success existed.
The proper use for a patent is for excluding others from making,
using, or selling the invention described in the patent. The inventor
cannot extend the monopoly to suppress competition.85 "When a pat-
ent owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield to protect his
invention, but as a sword to eviscerate competition unfairly, that
owner may be found to have abused the grant and may become liable
for antitrust violations. 86 This sort of predatory behavior87 in patent
litigation by firms can be found in the plaintiff's litigation history.
"The litigation history of the plaintiff is valuable in determining anti-
trust liability."88
Cyrix had the fortune or misfortune of selecting an area where you
have a dominant competitor, Intel Corporation.... The company
[Cyrix] was founded in 1988. The first product was introduced in
1989, the first lawsuit filed in 1990. And it's pretty much been
escalating ever since . ..89
The firm's object in predatory litigation may be to hamper com-
petition9" by imposing burdensome litigation costs; to limit their ac-
cess to funds; to deny a competitor entry into the field;91 or to reveal
confidential information through the discovery process.
[E]ven if only partially or temporarily successful, a lawsuit may
entail a damage award, temporary injunctive relief that hampers the
85. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942); reh'g denied,
314 U.S. 488 (1942). There the court found that stating that a patent grants only a monopoly for
making, using, or selling the invention described in the patent; the inventor cannot extend the
monopoly to suppress competition.
86. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1990).
87. Robert Bork defines predatory behavior thusly:
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm's deliberate aggression
against one or more rivals through the employment of business practices that
would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that
1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator with a market share
sufficient to command monopoly profits, or 2) rivals will be chastened suffi-
ciently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or
threatening.
Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L. J. 565, 579, (citing ROBERT H. BoRn,
THE ANrrRusT PARADox: A POuCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347 (1978)).
88. Michael Paul Chu, An antitrust solution t6 the new wave ofpredatoy patent infringe-
ment litigation. 33 WM. AND MARY L. Rv. 1341, 1364 (1992).
89. TExAs LAWYER, supra note 4, at 10.
90. "Hampering a competitors ability to compete by imposing a burdensome cost of litiga-
tion can be a reason for litigation." Myers, supra note 87, at 589.
91. "[P]redatory behavior may be used to deter potential competitors from entering a mar-
ket." Id. at 592.
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target's ability to compete ... [it] may be forced to divulge propri-
etary information, such as trade secrets, new product developments,
and marketing strategies in the course of discovery... while a suit
is pending, the target firm may also be forced to disclose its contin-
gent liability to creditors [and others] ... hamper[ing] its ability to
obtain funds.92
If any of the criteria can be met for bringing the suit in bad faith, the
defendant may be able to have the court impose sanctions, dismiss the
suit or to award Sherman Act treble antitrust damages to the innocent
defendant.93
M. Inequitable conduct
When an entity institutes an action before the ITC, the commis-
sion is empowered to apply standards to pre-institution conduct of
complainants and their counsel.94 The complainant has a duty of can-
dor. A breach of that duty is found through a two-part test. To find a
breach there must be clear and convincing evidence of: 1) a failure to
disclose or submission of false material information; and 2) an intent
to mislead the commission.95 Such a finding by clear and convincing
evidence would lead to a finding of no unfair competition by the
complainant.
In an FDC proceeding, a patent may be held unenforceable upon
a showing that the applicant engaged in inequitable conduct before the
Patent and Trademark Office. The test for such a contention is two-
fold: first, do the withheld references satisfy a threshold level of ma-
teriality, and second, does the applicant's conduct satisfy a threshold
showing of intent to mislead? The intent96 of the patentee may be
shown through direct evidence of intentional fraud or it may be in-
ferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. 7 In this showing
intent requires more than gross negligence.98
92. Handgards.743 F.2d at 1296.
93. See Hydro-Tech Corp v. Sundstrand Corp, 673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982). For an
example of entry deterrence involving vigorous and perhaps unjustified enforcement of IP
rights.
94. In the Matter of CERTAIN WOODWORKING ACCESSORIES, 1992 ITC LEXIS 41.
95. Id. Intent includes gross negligence in this test. Id. at *12.
96. However, "simple negligence, oversight, or an erroneous judgment made in good faith
does not give rise to a charge of inequitable conduct." J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747
F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
97. Paragon Podiatry v. KLM Labs, 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
98. Intel Corp. v. ULSI System, 782 F. Supp 1467, 1473 (D. Or. 1991). For alternative
definition, see Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Tex.
1992). ("When a party unreasonably pursues a patent infringement action, a court may properly
infer bad faith whether grounded or denominated in wrongful intent, recklessness, or gross
negligence.")
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If both threshold inquiries are satisfied, the court then balances
the materiality and intent to determine whether the misrepresentation
or omission and level of culpable intent make it inequitable to enforce
the patent.9 If inequitable conduct is shown with respect to some of
the claims in a patent application, the entire patent is unenforceable. e10
Before the District Court, a showing of inequitable conduct can invali-
date a patent, while before the ITC it can only lead to a finding of no
unfair competition in the import of the specified products.
IV. EXTRA-TERRToRiAL EFFECT OF DOMESTIC RULING
The three-part test for the extra-territorial application of an in-
junction under the Lanham Act10' was set forth in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank ofnAmerica Nat ' Trust and Savings Assoc.1 2 First, there
must be an effect on American foreign commerce; second, the effect
must be a cognizable injury to the plaintiff; and finally, the interests
and links to American foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong
in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of extra-
territorial authority.
The concern a domestic company has when using the Federal
District Courts is the effect and enforcement of any judgment it might
receive. How does a company show the three-part Timberlane °3 test
in order to secure the extraterritorial effect of domestic judgments? In
Timberlane itself the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the first prong of
the test, namely an effect on American foreign commerce, so the court
did not reach the third prong of the test with its eight criteria. °4
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. law has been a concern for both
the court and domestic businesses for many years."0 5 While the early
cases were anti-trust or due process centered, the principles applied
are valid to IP law today. In Mannington Mills, Inc., V. Congoleum
99. Al-Site Corp v. Opti-Ray Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9807; 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d(BNA)
1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
100. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F. 2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
102. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. 549 F.2d at 613.
104. "'The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law..
the nationality., of the parties.. principal places of businesses . . extent to which
enforcement can achieve compliance. . relative significance of effects on U.S...
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm U.S. commerce . . foreseeability
of such effect., relative importance of violation within the U.S. as compared with
conduct abroad."
549 F.2d at 614.
105. See Vermilya-Brown Co, v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
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Corp,"°6 the court used the Timberlane analysis to dismiss an antitrust
complaint which charged fraudulent procurement of patents by a do-
mestic corporation in foreign countries.
The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 402, allows a
state to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe laws with respect to: 1) con-
duct that takes place within its territory; 2) conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory; 3)
activities and interests of its nation, and; 4) activities against the
state's security interest.
Section 403 requires that the exercise of jurisdiction be 'reason-
able' and gives a non-exclusive list of concerns to weigh in order to
determine 'reasonableness'. The list includes the location of chal-
lenged conduct, the effects within the regulating state, the nationalities
of the parties, the importance of the regulation to the regulating state,
the likelihood of conflict with another states laws, and the extent to
which the regulation is consistent with the international system.
With respect to trademark protection, the Lanham Act t°7 pro-
vides for undefined jurisdiction by U.S. courts. 08 The Supreme Court
has applied it to a U.S. citizen operating a factory in Mexico and vio-
lating a valid U.S. trademark.' 09 Lower courts have found the Lan-
ham Act applicable in cases where a U.S. national engages in
trademark infringement abroad that injures domestic trademark hold-
ers."l0 In the case of foreign defendants who violate a domestic trade-
mark, the Lanham Act may apply where it can be shown that the
violation has U.S. effects."'
In deciding whether U.S. anti-trust laws can apply to conduct
abroad, the three-part Timberlane test has been applied" 2 The first
two prongs taken together require a showing that foreign conduct had
a direct and substantial anti-competitive effect on U. S. commerce. 1 3
The third prong predicates jurisdiction upon a showing that the "inter-
106. 595 F.2d. 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
108. Any person who shall, in commerce, use without the consent of the registrant... shall
be liable to civil action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies provided. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1).
109. Steele V. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
110. See American Rice, Inc. V. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. 1983).
111. See Reebok Int'l Ltd. V. Mamatech Enters, 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir 1992).
112. Gary B. Born, A reappraisal of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, 24 LAw & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 34.
113. Id.
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ests of and links to the U.S. are sufficiently strong,... to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority."'1
14
In addition to the reach of substantive domestic law above, the
Supreme Court has given an extraterritorial reach to discovery re-
quests in domestic suits."' Until 1987, both federal and state courts
found that a domestic party wanting to secure discovery would first
have to attempt to follow the Hague Convention procedures with re-
spect to evidence abroad. In James Vincent v. Motobecane,"6 the
New Jersey court held that before a court can impose sanctions 17 or
enter a default judgment because of a foreign defendant's failure to
comply with the court's discovery orders, the plaintiff must attempt to
use the Hague Convention procedures for discovery requests.1 ' This
was especially true where the foreign country has indicated that it
would entertain the request. In General Electric Co. v. North Star
International,'19 the court required the plaintiff to first use the Hague
Convention and then apply to the court for an order to compel under
the Federal Rules if the defendant was uncooperative in discovery
proceedings.' 20
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court,'2' the Court found that "the concept of international
comity122 [something more than mere international manners, but less
than obligation]' 23determines the appropriate reach of extraterritorial
U.S. discovery in cases' 24 where the Hague Convention ap-
plies"(parenthetical added).'25  However, it is not the exclusive or
mandatory procedure for obtaining documents and information located
in a foreign country. The convention is rather an optional procedure
that is available whenever it will facilitate the gathering of evidence
114. Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 613. See discusion supra part IV.
115. Supra note 112, at 48.
116. 193 N.J. Super. 716; 475 A.2d 686 (1984).
117. "The mere fact of sovereignty does not insulate a lititgant from sanction for failure to
abide by the rules governing litigation in American courts." Republic of the Philippines v. West-
inghouse Corp., 43 F. 3d 65; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35639, *32 (3rd. Cir. 1994).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1781.
119. 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 207 (Feb. 1984).
120. However, see Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG, 101 F.R.D. 360; 39 Fed. R. Serv.
2d(Callaghan) 500 (April 1984). (The court held that a party did not have to use the Hague
Convention to secure discovery of evidence abroad.)
121. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
122. "courtesy, respect, a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of
deference and good will." Blacks Law Dictionary.
123. Republic of the Philippines, 43 F.3d 65; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35639, *29 (3d Cir.
N.J. 1994).
124. Although this applies only with respect to litigants already before the court.
125. Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 543-44.
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from a party. This decision has led courts to require extraterritorial
discovery where significant U.S. connections and interests were in-
volved"2 6 or not allow it where the U.S. interests were slight. 127
Some foreign countries have passed 'blocking statutes' 128 to in-
hibit the reach of U.S. courts. These statutes come into conflict with
U.S. litigants attempting to apply the extrarritorial reach of domestic
decisions. 129 U.S. courts have given little deference to these statutes.
In USA v. Earl Tripplett, Revenue Officer, IRS v. The First National
Bank of Chicago 130 the court found that the fact that foreign law may
subject a person to criminal sanctions in the foreign country if he
produces certain information does not automatically bar a domestic
court from compelling production. In doing so the court is required to
engage in a sensitive balancing of the competing interests at stake in
compelling such production. The court listed the factors to balance in
United States v Vetco as: 1) vital national interests of each of the
states; 2) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person; 3) the extent to
which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state; 4) the nationality of the person; 5) the extent to which enforce-
ment by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve
compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."' 1
Consequently, when a domestic business is attempting to assert
an IP protection, regardless of the motive, the business must decide in
which forum to bring the action, and whether that forum will be able
to reach the respondent with any judgment it makes. The business
litigation strategy can be successfully pursued in either forum, with
the most effective tactic being to pursue the target company in both
forums. This allows for the relative speed of the ITC forum to stop
'infringing' goods from being imported, while the FDC action allows
the remedy of damages. The key to litigation in either is a docu-
126. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384(11th. Cir. 1982).
127. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d. 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
128. The French Blocking Statute: Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980:
Article 1-bis: Subject to any treaties or international agreements and the laws and
regulations in force, it is prohibited for any person to request, to investigate or to
communicate in writing, orally or by any other means, documents or information
relating to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters lead-
ing to the establishment of proof with a view to foreign administrative or judicial
proceedings or as a part of such proceeding.
129. The U.K. [blocking] Act prohibits domestic courts from complying with proscribed
foreign court orders .. a foreign request for information can be found objectionable if it simply
infringes upon the jurisdiction of the U.K. or is otherwise prejudicial to its sovereignty. SEC
expands enforcement role to the International marketplace, NAT'L L. J., Ap. 24, 1989, at 26.
130. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
131. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981).
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mented, good faith basis to enforce valid IP rights, not to just suppress
competition.
V. PROCEEDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUITY
Intel and the U.S. semiconductor industry are focusing upon pro-
tecting our investments in research and development. The suits..
are part of a larger process in which the company is stepping up its
efforts to protect its intellectual property rights... Intel is seeking
an exclusion order (from the ITC) that would prevent ... EPROMS
from being sold in the U.S.' 32
The European Community (EC) has historically been an impor-
tant export market for U.S. semiconductor producers. In 1990, the EC
accounted for about 16 percent of total semiconductor exports from
the U.S., Texas Instruments set up a state of the art semiconductor
fabrication plant in Italy, and Intel announced plans for a plant in Ire-
land. Growth of capital expenditures was expected to exceed every
other region of the world, from 1991 to 1995.'
As the EC increases in importance to domestic companies, the
need for firms to investigate IP protection there is growing as well.
When firms enter a foreign market and use the foreign countries IP
protection to aid in the marketing of their products, the foreign firms
are responding by either creating their own technologies or by taking
advantage of their IP laws to use the U.S. firm's intellectual property.
A firm which has pursued a business litigation strategy domesti-
cally is faced with several twists when attempting to extend that strat-
egy to the EC. These include EC treaties, national law, unsettled case
law, and most importantly, the Treaty of Rome.
The Treaty of Rome 134 prohibits the owner of an IP right from
preventing the importation and marketing of a product which has been
lawfully marketed in another Member State by the owner, with his
consent or by a person connected with him legally or economically.1
35
This applies whether the product was first marketed under the IP right
in question or in a Member State where no protection is available.
136
Further, it is impossible for individuals to contract out of the binding
132. Section 1, World Trade News, FIN'L Tnras, Aug. 7, 1987 at 4.
133. USITC Monthly Import/Business Review, 1991 ITC LEXIS 1249.
134. See appendix I for article 85 and 86, the competition rules of the treaty.
135. EC Commentaries, Sept 30, 1993, Coopers & Lybrand Europe 1. See also, Centrafarm
V. Sterling Drug, (Case 15/74) 1974 E.C.R. 1147.
136. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Stephar B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler, Court of Justice
(Case 187/80)[1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 8446, 8456 [ 8707]. (LEXIS, Eurcom, Cases).
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provisions of the Treaty for the free movement of goods. 137 All con-
tracts involving trade between member states come under the Treaty.
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome are the principle stat-
utes concerning how firms compete in the EC. Article 85 prohibits
(and declares void" 8 ) "all agreements between undertakings . . .
which may affect trade between member states.., and which have as
their effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition...".
Article 86 prohibits the 'abuse' of a 'dominant position' within the EC
or in a substantial part of it and gives general definitions of 'abuse'. 3 9
A. Article 85
Article 85 is directed against anti-competitive agreements. It
prohibits 'any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by as-
sociations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely
to affect trade between the Member State and which have as their ob-
ject or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market.' The last two clauses may cause
problems for firms attempting to use IP protection to safeguard or in-
crease market share. The business litigation strategy can be seen as a
concerted practice which affects trade between member state and has
as its objective the distortion of competition within the EC.
One result of a litigation strategy is a settlement agreement end-
ing litigation. 40 In order to comply with Article 85, an IP settlement
agreement and ancillary license should restrict the defendant from in-
fringing, rather than restrict him from manufacturing or selling a cate-
gory of products some of which may not infringe the rights.' 4 ' The
agreement should avoid no-challenge clauses except in very limited
circumstances, 142 particularly in the case of trademark delimitation
agreements. Further, it should avoid geographical market partitioning
and adopt the least restrictive solution in the circumstances. In ancil-
137. See Dansk Supermarked A/S v. Imerco A/S, Court of Justice (Case 58/80)[1981] 1
C.M.L.R. 8759, 8767 [ 8729]. (LEXIS, Eurcom, Cases).
138. Article 85 § 2.
139. Wamer-Lambert/Gillette & Ors; BIC/Gillette & Ors (Decision 93/252), [19931 2 CEC
2,039, 2,046 (Commission of the European Communities). In Warner, a Swedish company
sold the rights to a shaving business to an American company and an EC company. Warner, a
U.S. company, complained to the Commission alleging an infringement of Article 85 and 86 in
the sale. After a determination of dominance, abuse and effect in the EC, the commission held
that the parties abused a dominant position by the sale and rescinded it. Id. at 2,051-2.
140. Intellectual Property Disputes: Settlement Agreements and Ancillary Licenses under
EC and UK Competition Law, 15 EUR. INTEL. PRop. REv. 48 (1993).
141. See Bayer AG & Anor v. Heinz Sulhofer, (Case 65/86) [1990] 1 CEC 220,246.
142. Id.
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lary licenses it should ensure that so far as possible the terms of the
patent, the block exemptions are followed. 14 3
B. Article 86
1. Dominant position within the EC
Article 86 states that any abuse of a dominant position within the
Common Market shall be prohibited.'" It does not address the exact
definition of dominant position but an EC court has found that "... an
intellectual property right such as a patent can give a patentee a domi-
nant position."' 45 While in Hilti AG v. Commission of the European
Communities, the court found that when attempting to find whether
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome were violated, the court
must first determine if the firm occupies a 'dominant position. ' 14 6
This is found by defining the relevant product market, the geographic
market, and defendant's position in the market.' 47 The court's deci-
sion indicates that an exclusive patent in one member state may be
enough to establish a dominant position as long as its behavior reflects
its ability to act independently and without due regard to, either com-
petitors or customers in the markets in question.'48 Generally, a domi-
nant postion may be defined as having the power to act without paying
attention to rivals, suppliers or purchasers, with 'independence of con-
duct as the yardstick.' 49
2. Abuse of dominant position
Achieving a dominant position is not a violation of EC law. But
once a dominant position has been established, the possible existence
of abuse must be investigated to establish if there is a violation. There
is a two-prong definition for abuse of dominant position. 5 ' First,
there must be a restraint on competition; second, the dominant enter-
prise must have used different methods from those which govern nor-
mal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions
of traders. The court looks for improper behavior which frustrated or
143. See Commission Decision (82/897/EEC), relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 412. (LEXIS, Eurcom, Comdec).
144. See Appendix I.
145. Chiron Corp, et al v. Organon Teknika Limited, et al., Chancery Division (Patents
Court) [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 813. (LEXIS, Eurcon, Cases).
146. (Case T-30/89), [1992] 1 CEC 155,156.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Robert E. Creese, Note, EEC Competition Law: Tetra Pak Confirms the Disseverance
of Block-Exemption Protection from Agreements Formed by Firms Acting in Abuse of Dominant
Position, 25 CORNLL INrER'L L. J. 131, 142-3 (1992).
150. lod at 149.
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delayed legitimately available licenses of right, or behavior which was
discriminatory against the business of competitors and their custom-
ers. This may be found by pricing the grant of licenses much higher
than the figure ultimately appointed by the Comptroller of Patents.
The Hilti court reasoned that by demanding such a large fee Hilti was
needlessly protracting the proceedings for the grant of licenses of right
and that such behavior "undeniably constitutes an abuse."'' The court
also found that Hilti was selective and discriminatory in its policies
towards its competitors and their customers which also indicated
abuse and that the evidence could not justify Hilti's subsequent
behavior.
At the other end of the spectrum, in Chiron Corp, et al v. Orga-
non Telnika Limited, et al., the court found that "it is well settled that
the refusal to license a patent or registered design cannot per se
amount to an abuse of a dominant position."'1 2  It may not be an
abuse, but the refusal to grant a license may be grounds for the appli-
cation by the rejected licensee to the government for the issuance of a
compulsory license. In Dansk Supermarket v. Imerco'53 the court
found that importation into a Member State of goods lawfully mar-
keted in another Member State could not be classified as an improper
or unfair commercial practice.
These decisions indicate that the law with respect to the abuse of
dominant position is unsettled. A firm trying to protect its IP rights
may have to grant a license so as not to abuse its 'dominant' position,
because if it doesn't it may be sued for violating Article 86, in addi-
tion to having a compulsory license granted as well.
3. Effect of abuse between member states
After the court finds abuse and dominant position it looks to the
effect on trade between member States. 154 The court applied the rule
that under Article 86 any abuse which may affect trade between mem-
ber States is prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market.
In Hilti, the court looked at Hilti's behavior to determine if it was
likely to have repercussions on trade between member States. The
repercussions they were concerned with included limiting the entry of
independent manufacturers into the market which could harm com-
151. While the court didn't say it was a 'per se' rule, "undeniably" leaves little room for
argument.
152. Chancery Division (Patents Court) [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 813. (LEXIS, Eurcom, Cases).
153. Dansk Supermarked, (Case 58/80) [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 8759, 8767.
154. Hild, (Case T-30/89) [1992] 1 CEC 155,156.
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mercial interests in the United Kingdom or hamper or halt exports
between the member States.
The abuses found were those which sought to prevent or limit the
entry of competitors in to the market, or to damage or even eliminate
existing competitors. The commission contended that the acts were
designed to impair the whole structure of competition. Once a domi-
nant position was found and abuse effecting trade between member
states was determined, the court found Hilti violated Article 86 and
sustained the lower court.
Hilti provides lessons for U.S. firms attempting to protect their
IP or market share in Europe. Hilti's share of the market was around
55 percent. In addition, Hilti's market share was dominant because it
was protected by patents, Hilti had a strong research and development
position, and a strong and well-organized distribution system in the
EC. Hilti's behavior evidenced its ability to act independently of, and
without due regard to, either competitors or customers in the markets
in question. That behavior justified the conclusion that its primary
concern was the protection of its commercial position rather than a
disinterested wish to protect users of its products.
U.S. firms attempting to protect their IP rights in Europe must
show one of the following; a primary concern for the protection of the
consumers of its goods, and not the protection of market share; or no
effect of the agreement in question on trade between the member
states; or that they are not a 'dominant' firm in the relevant market,
either for product or geographically; or that their actions were objec-
tively justified by market concerns and not an 'abuse' of dominant
position.
4. Bad faith and abuse of dominant position
Case law relating to the use of a predatory litigation strategy in
the EC is limited. In Pitney Bowes In. v. Francotyp-Postalia GmbH
and Another,"'5 the American plaintiff sued for infringement of its
franking machine patent in the U.K. Defendants denied infringement
and counterclaimed an Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome abuse of
dominant position defense. The court found that allegations of bad
faith must be unambiguously alleged, which they were not in the in-
stant case; and even if they had been clearly pleaded, bad faith prose-
cution is not an abuse of dominant position as much as it is an
independent tort of malicious prosecution. The court found that the
155. [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 466 (LEXIS, Eurcom. Cases).
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plaintiff did not have to reach to the treaty when a national statute
would be enough, and thus did not apply the Treaty of Rome.
However, in its opinion the court cited to Volvo AB vs. Erik
Veng 156 as a "clear affirmation of the view that the abuses need not be
a direct or even an indirect consequence of the relief claimed in the
particular action. It is sufficient that the existence of the IP right cre-
ates or buttresses the dominant position which the plaintiff is abus-
ing." By referring to 'dominant position' the court seemed to be
reaching for the treaty while at the same time saying it was not
necessary.
The Pitney Bowes ruling should be regarded in the light of the
finding in Commission Decision 88/501 of 26 July 1988 Relating to a
Proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (Tetra Pak I
(BTG-license)157 [Hereinafter Tetra Pak]. In Tetra Pak the Commis-
sion found that a non-EC firm had violated EC competition law. As a
result of an exclusive license, Tetra Pak had prevented potential com-
petitors from entering its market. This led to unduly strengthening its
own position in the market and an abuse of dominant position in viola-
tion of Article 86. Even though both parties to the license were non-
EC, the Commission held that the EC had jurisdiction over agreements
between non-EC firms which affect competition within the Common
Market. Therefore, as far as the EC was concerned, it could force
Tetra Pak to relinquish its exclusive license within the EC. The court
emphasized the 'unduly strengthening' of Tetra Pak's commercial po-
sition. This could be applied when a firm develops a litigation strat-
egy which in it's application goes beyond 'malicious prosecution' and
becomes the 'unduly strengthening' of a commercial position.
5. Compulsory license
In the U.S., once a patent has been issued the patentee has the
exclusive use of the patent for a set number of years. The EC has a
different regime for patents. If a patent is not 'worked' within the pat-
ent granting country within a specified period, the government may
award a compulsory license, for a reasonable royalty, to a firm to
work the patent within the country. Although there is some discussion
of what constitutes 'working' (see below), it is generally considered to
be manufacturing or importing into the country in question.
In Re Compulsory Patent Licenses: EC Commission v. United
Kingdom, Court of Justice of the European Communities 58 the court
156. [1989] 4 C.M.L.R 122 (LEXIS, Eurcom, Cases).
157. [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 47 (LEXIS, Eurcorn, Comdec).
158. [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 709 (LEXIS, Eurcom, Cases).
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discussed the applicable patent conventions and the grant of compul-
sory licenses. The Paris Convention, Article 5(A), §§ 2, 4 addresses
the issue of compulsory patents and the criteria for issuance.159 The
Convention for the European Patent,160 Article 47 addresses the issue
of compulsory licenses as well.161
Both conventions also accept the efficacy of national patents, but
only as far as they not infringe the convention. For example, in the
United Kingdom patents are covered by the Patents Act of 1977. It
provides for the grant of compulsory patent licenses at any time after
the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of the patent,
on the grounds such as, not working the patent to fuffill reasonable
demand for the product. The UK doesn't recognize imports as a sub-
stitute for domestic working of the patent. This is in violation of the
Conventions and has been ruled invalid.162
In Italy, the Civil Code §§ 2584 - 2591 governs compulsory
licenses. It provides that non-exploitation of a patent is grounds for a
compulsory license and that imports don't constitute exploitation.
This section has been found to violate the Conventions as well, and
has been found void. [Denmark's and Spain's rules for compulsory
licenses has also been ruled void. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal have been found in
compliance with the Conventions.] 63
159. PARIS CONVEnON FOR THE PROTEION OF INDUrRIAL PROPERTY (amended 1967):
Article 5(A):
Section 2. Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent, for example, failure to work.
Section 4. A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of
failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date
of the grant of the patent , whichever period expires last, it shall be refused if the
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license
shall be non-exclusive and shall not be transferable , even in the form of the grant
of a sub-license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits
such license.
160. THE EURoPEAN PATENT CoNVmaoN (1973). Signed in 1973, all EC member states
are members as well as Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Monaco.
The objective of the Convention is to enable an applicant who seeks patent protection in
more than one Convention country to achieve this by making a single application in a single
language to the European Patent Office. The effect of this patent in any of the countries applied
for is the same as that of a national patent in that country (except for duration and nullification).
161. It requires that when ascertaining if a patent has not been worked in a state, that the
importation of the patented goods in question from another member state satisfies the 'working'
requirement. (It doesn't address the importation of goods from non-member states.)
162. Re Compulsory Patent Licenses, [1992] 2 CMLR 709.
163. lId
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As re Compulsory Patent Licenses indicates, the lawful import
of a product from another member state satisfies the 'working' re-
quirement before an EC compulsory license can be issued. A domes-
tic firm still must abide by the convention, however, with respect to
the time (four years) to begin working the patent. With respect to the
business litigation strategy, this means once a patent is secured in the
target country, litigation or the threat of litigation can continue for
four years with little product exposure. This might impact the courts
determination of bad faith in the patent infringement suits (see above),
but beyond that a firm could have four years of royalties without go-
ing to the expense of actually having a product in the target country.
CONCLUSION
This essay discusses the options facing a U.S. firm when trying to
protect IP assets by pursuing a business litigation strategy, in the U.S.
and the EC. A company pursuing this strategy in the EC needs to
frame its actions to conform to the Treaty of Rome, Articles 85 and
86, as well as the small amount of case law on point. This will allow
the firm to avoid the 'abuse of dominant position' that articles 85 and
86 prohibit. In the U.S., the strategies will be effective as long as they
conform to the requirements of the Sherman Act and related anti-trust
considerations.
APPENDIX I
TREATY OF ROME' 64
Rules on Competition
Article 85
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com-
mon market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by as-
sociations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object of effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the com-
mon market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any
other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development,
or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
164. TRE TABLISHING THE EutoPa. EcoNOMic COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
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(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no commotion with the subject
of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article
shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inappli-
cable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of there objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating com-
petition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Article 86
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohib-
ited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect
trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts.
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